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Six years after the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, two prominent 
dynamics define the new regional disorder. On the one hand, popular 
revolts and subsequent internal conflicts, and civil strives in many 
countries, led to the weakening or compete-destruction of central-
state capacities to control and regulate socio-economic and power 
relations. On the other, war-torn and conflict-ridden states in the 
MENA region became battlefields for regional and international powers 
amidst intensifying geopolitical competition, which have increasingly 
come to influence - if not altogether shape - outcomes on the national 
level within conflict countries. In some instances, these interventions 
helped in the re-imposition of order, albeit on authoritarian terms, 
which has been the case in Bahrain with the Saudi military invasion 
and the suppression of the revolt against the monarchy. This was 
also the case with the support given to Egypt’s military in the wake 
of the takeover in mid-2013. In other cases, geopolitical competition 
deepened internal conflict and further undermined states’ capabilities 
to regulate and control their territories and populations. This meant 
supporting militias and local armed groups, cross-regional sectarian 
(e.g. the Sunni-Shiite divide that cuts across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and 
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Yemen, emanating from Saudi Arabia and Iran) or ethnic 
identities (e.g. the Kurdish question). Economic networks 
and channels were formed, through which new flows of 
people, ideas and monies were to be governed beyond the 
state. 
Analytically, we can generally state that the national level 
has become less relevant over time as it has been regional 
and local powers, networks and flows that have caused 
many Arab states to become scenes of action by others. 
Many of these are non-state, as opposed to states acting as 
actors that are capable of defining and pursuing interests 
as coherent organisations. The local and the regional 
came to collide, bypassing the national. Many socio-
economic and political phenomena that were historically 
considered sub-national or a sign of incomplete statehood 
assumed a regional character after the Arab revolutions. 
A prime example would be economic informality, which 
has often been a key feature in the creation and exchange 
of economic value in the MENA region. However, it 
assumed complex regional forms such as cross-border 
trade and networks, which tied local economic and 
political elites in a general regional dynamic of exchange. 
This led to the effective rise of altered forms of governance, 
especially with many militias, armed groups, tribe-
leaders and local notables being tied to these regionalised 
networks and spaces of wealth and power exchanges. An 
example is the informal-trade triangle between Tunisia, 
Libya and Algeria, where not only goods are smuggled, 
but also money, arms and people. The same dynamics 
also seem to be at play in the case of Egypt’s Eastern and 
Western borders with Gaza and Libya respectively, as well 
as on the Syrian-Turkish borders. In this context, new 
economic actors formed, ranging from lay smugglers to 
others with political or military functions. A striking case 
would be the illegal oil trading that involves the Islamic 
State Organisation (ISIS) through networks into Turkey, 
as well as within Syria, where the militant group could 
establish what seem to be permanent oil-trade networks. 
Similarly, Libyan city-states and their local armies and 
militias control trade routes, oil fields, as well as ports 
and airports. 
The weakening or the partial-to-total collapse of central 
governments allowed the emergence of new spaces and 
hubs, actors and flows that were either non-existent before 
the Arab revolutions or that existed on a small scale. For 
example, the MENA region witnessed a territorialisation 
of Jihadist control in Syria, Iraq and Libya by the Islamic 
State Organisation, which claimed sovereignty over 
parts of these war-torn states. In a similar vein yet less 
dramatically, post-2011 Libya witnessed the rise of 
effectively sovereign city-states. 
Towards a regionally integrated approach 
If the primary interest in academic and policy circles is 
the future re-stabilisation of the MENA region, finding 
an answer is not possible unless some comprehensive 
and dynamic political economy approach is developed. 
This is currently lacking and the literature on the political 
economy of the MENA region has hitherto been sparse 
and thin. It has usually focused on single nation-states 
instead of assuming a regional dimension. Moreover, 
its focus has often been on formal state policies and 
institutions, or on state-private business interaction via 
cronyism, patronage or capture by private interests of 
corrupt incumbents or their business cronies. Economic 
informality, as rampant as it has always been on the 
national and regional levels, remained the traditional 
domain of statisticians or neoclassical economics with 
little sociological input, if any at all. It is time to streamline 
the study of informality, identifying how and whether it 
links up to formal economic institutions and markets 
in a time of globalisation.  This is not in the sense of a 
distorted form of economic and social activity, but rather 
as the predominant framework within which exchange 
happens in the MENA region. It is also time to go beyond 
single-state centred analysis and towards mapping the 
region or at least spaces and flows in the MENA region, 
where ultra-state and regionalised inter- and intra-state 
networks, actors and flows reign supreme. 
How can regional influences (flows of aid, fighters, arms, 
informal trade, migration and refuge seekers etc.) be 
addressed, contained and reconfigured for the creation of 
a new order or to limit the current features of disorder 
on a national and regional basis? What are the political-
economic underpinnings of such stabilisation efforts 
given the long history of deeply entrenched national and 
regional patterns of marginalisation, unaccomplished 
development and failed political arrangements? And 
how can regional flows, both inter-state and ultra-state, 
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especially informal trade but also migration, that exist 
on the ground in weakly-regulated zones be integrated 
into the development efforts on the national and regional 
levels?
Studying the new dynamics of political economy in the 
MENA region requires an integrated approach that, 
methodologically and analytically, goes beyond the 
state into broader regional determinants of national 
and local processes. Going beyond the state recognises, 
with the facts on the ground, that in many parts of the 
MENA region the locus of the interplay between wealth 
and power – the subject matter of political economy 
- is no longer driven by central states. This means that 
an integrated approach would entail drawing a map 
of the region without borders, tracing trans-national 
flows, regionalised local and national elite networks (e.g. 
business partnerships between the military in Egypt and 
Saudi and United Arab Emirates businessmen, usually 
with dense political connections) and new spaces that 
transcend claimed boundaries between sovereign states 
(e.g. the informal trade zone between Tunisia, Libya 
and Algeria). It would also mean going beyond the 
state analytically and conceptually by studying ultra-
state actors (e.g. militias and local armed groups), flows 
and networks, and primarily the regionalised forms of 
informal - that is to say non-state regulated or controlled 
- movement of people, goods, monies, arms and ideas. 
Without doubt, the state remains relevant for any 
credible and serious analysis. It is a matter of fact that 
re-construction efforts, socio-political reconciliation 
and the reconstitution of national polities in war-torn 
countries, as well as in conflict-ridden post-revolution 
cases, all involve the nation-state. However, the 
determinants of these processes in the current context all 
but go beyond the claimed borders of states and hinge 
upon regional dynamics, flows, actors and hubs. This 
applies to sectarian and ethnic identities that are of a 
clear ultra-state character even though they are critical 
inputs in any national reconciliation process, especially in 
countries like Syria, Iraq and Yemen. It also applies to the 
effective regulation of extended spaces of informal trade, 
human migration and militia control in North Africa. The 
same logic applies to inter- and intra-state as well as ultra-
state mechanisms and patterns of oil-rent recycling from 
oil-rich nations like Iran, the GCC members and Algeria, 
to oil-poor countries. Historically, oil recycling has been 
crucial in understanding the dynamics of international 
and civil wars; of development models and actual 
interdependencies through remittances and migratory 
labour forces; and of the financing of reconstruction and 
stabilisation efforts on the national and regional levels. 
A regionally integrated approach to the MENA region’s 
political economy should be equipped to capture 
complex post-Arab revolution processes in whole and in 
motion. The development of such theoretically-informed 
framework, based on extensive fieldwork and intimate 
knowledge of the region, should depict the patterns of 
interaction between old and new actors (both political 
and economic), as well as between emerging flows, spaces 
and hubs. The ultimate goal is to reduce the complexity 
of what has been occurring in the MENA region and to 
provide new paradigms to make it intelligible, analysable 
and hopefully predictable. This carries some serious 
implications and potential contributions to policy-
making, and to different stakeholders in the MENA region 
and its surroundings. Europe in particular feels an impact 
regarding efforts to re-make a regional order, re-think 
regional economic integration, and in its post-conflict 
reconciliation, reconstruction and the resumption of 
economic development.  
A research mission: mapping the MENA 
region without borders 
A new approach to the MENA region’s political economy 
following the Arab revolutions requires the resetting of the 
research agenda with one central mission: to draw a map 
without borders, which indicates actors and networks, 
flows and spaces de facto on the ground. With the right 
dosage of theoretical, conceptual and methodological 
innovation and ingenuity, such a map should highlight 
the mechanisms through which, with the generalised 
weakening of central state agencies, power and wealth 
are being (re)-instituted in the MENA region. The map 
would indicate the dynamics of disorder in conflict- and 
war-torn countries, and the co-constituting mechanisms 
of local (i.e. sub-national) and regional actors that are 
deeply embedded in networks of power and wealth. 
Only through such mapping, can new and old actors be 
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identified and the forces of disorder rationalised with the 
possibility of re-integrating them into a rising order in 
the MENA region. The new research mission would set 
to map the following:
1. Mapping power networks of actors by identifying 
old and new actors, the genealogy and genesis of their 
power, relations with formal state institutions (or what 
remained of them) and perspectives towards post-
conflict scenarios. This would apply to formal actors 
like governments and official bodies, but also to banks 
and investment funds (for instance GCC investors in 
Egypt or Lebanon). It would also look deep into how 
formal (e.g. private investors) as well as informal (e.g. 
smugglers and militias) non-state actors became related 
to new configurations of power and economic resource 
distribution. Arab revolutions have demonstrated the 
rising significance of political and economic resource 
networks that are wholly composed of non-state actors. 
Examples include networks that govern informal trade 
through the North African desert or those that control 
human trafficking, oil smuggling and arms trade, not to 
mention Jihadist transportation and circulation between 
the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. 
2. Distinguishing, categorising and mapping flows: 
The MENA region has always shown intensive regional 
patterns of interaction and integration through public or 
private flows of goods and services, money, people and 
ideas. This has been considerably transformed after 2011 
as the old order (both inter-state as well as intra-state 
arrangements and institutions in many cases) was either 
completely destroyed or radically transformed. It is fair 
to say that “disorder” is regional in its dynamics, causes 
and impacts. This however proved to have differentiated 
impacts and consequences at national and local levels. 
Capturing this is crucial in order to understand potential 
post-conflict reconstruction and development. The 
restoration of any order, or in other words stabilisation, 
can only be dealt with from a regional angle or even from 
an inter-regional perspective, counting Europe in, given 
the impact the disorder in the MENA region is causing 
there. Studying regional flows requires unpacking these 
phenomena and breaking them down into their political-
economic and sociological components. 
3. Identifying and demarcating hubs and spaces, which 
are the sights and scenes of flows and actors. These hubs 
are often located in new physical spaces where different 
forms of intercourse were introduced or were radically 
transformed. A prime example would be the cross-border 
areas where flows of goods, money and people pass, such 
as the triangle between Libya, Tunisia and Algeria or the 
Turkish-Syrian borders. Some cities and territories gained 
a central role in the articulation of trade, money and 
migration flows: Dubai, Misrata, Ben-Guerdane, Zuwara 
and Aleppo, to name a few. Another example is refugee 
camps, in countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey that 
were formed with the massive population displacement 
in Syria and Iraq. These newly founded centers of human 
concentrations served as hubs for migratory movement 
to Europe as well as in the MENA region. They have also 
assumed special importance in recruitment for militias 
and armed groups.
In conclusion, the pre-2011 MENA region has little 
to share with the region of the post-2011 revolutions. 
Traditional political-economic approaches that once 
centered on Arab states as autonomous actors with self-
contained and clearly demarcated interactions, are hardy 
adequate for the present situation. What is needed is a 
regionally integrated approach to the political economy 
of the MENA region, setting a new research mission with 
a newly developed tool-kit of concepts, methods and 
analytical angles. Such knowledge production is essential 
not only to policy-makers in the MENA region and in 
its surroundings, primarily in Europe, but also for the 
increasingly engaged public opinion and different social 
and economic stakeholders on the two shores of the 
Mediterranean. 
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